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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 8885

KURT M. LYMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in the defendant's
brief is fairly representative of the facts surrounding
this case with the following exceptions:
1. The defendant did enter a plea to the amended
information in this action, and his plea to the charge
contained ,therein was "not guilty." (R. 65).

2. Contrary to defendant's allegation that the lower
court denied his Motion to Quash filed on September 6,
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1957, the lower court actually granted the defendant's
Motion to Quash. However, the court then granted permission for the District Attorney to amend the information, to which amended information the defendant entered
a plea of "not guilty." These proceedings were held before the Court on September 6, 1957, and the defendant
appeared and was represented by his attorney, Elias
Hansen, at that time. (R. 65). A copy of the amended
complaint was then filed with the lower court on September 10, 1957. (R. 8).
3. On February 20, 1958, the defendant was sentenced but the execution of the sentence was suspended
and the defendant was placed on probation for 18 months,
subject to his compliance with the terms of the probation
agreement. (R. 62). This sentence was not suspended,
subject to the same being amended, as alleged in defendant's statement of facts contained in his brief on appeal.
The plaintiff adopts the statement of facts as set
forth in defendant's brief subject to the above noted exceptions.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION AND DEFENDANT IS IN ERROR BY ·CLAil\IING THAT THE LOWER
COURT REFUSED TO GRANT HIS MOTION TO QUASH;
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S ASSIGNMENT OR POINT I
INVOLVES NO JUSTICIABLE ISSUE.

(R. 65).
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POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
THE STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMATION, AND FURTHERMORE, THE DEFENDANT FAILED
TO MAKE HIS OBJECTION TIMELY IN THIS MATTER AND
IS THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM PURSUING HIS APPEAL UPON THIS POINT.

POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE EXHIBITS "B'' AND "C."

POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
THE WITNESS, PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUESTION:

"WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO

MR. LYMAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE PAYMENT FOR
SOMETHING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR .CONTRACTS?"
AS AMENDED BY ADDING THERETO "TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE?"
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
STRIKE THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDINAND ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN
MOTOR COMPANY.
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POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
MR. BLACK, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR
DEFENDANT, TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR.
HARMON TOOK OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EX·CESS OF
$5,000.00 OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. INSOFAR AS THIS
WITNESS FURTHER TESTIFIED AS TO THE FINANCIAL
CONDITION OF THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY AT PAGES
36-37 OF THE TRANSCRIPT, EACH AND EVERY ONE OF

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS WAS SUSTAINED THUS AFFORDING NO BASIS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT MAY
APPEAL.
POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
MR. BLACK TO TESTIFY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT, THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO
THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD
OF $800.00.
POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
EXHIBIT "J" TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE
OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT.
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
STRIKE THE STATEMENT OF MR. ZENGER WHILE TESTIFYING FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS
BEYOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WAS
OF A CRIMINAL NATURE.
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POINT X.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT AS TO CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY ,THE
DEFENDANT TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS.
POINT XI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1.
POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 2.
POINT XIII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 4.
POINT XIV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5,
NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GIVING ITS OWN
INSTRUCTION NO. 5.
POINT XV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 8.
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POINT XVI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING ITS
NINTH INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY.
POINT XVII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
POINT XVIII.
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID GRANT THE DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH THE INFORMATION AND DEFENDANT IS IN ERROR BY ·CLAIMING THAT THE LOWER
COURT REFUSED TO GRANT HIS MOTION TO QUASH;
THEREFORE, DEFENDANT'S ASSIGNMENT OR POINT I
INVOLVES NO JUSTICIABLE ISSUE.

(R. 65).

The Court's attention is directed to the minute entry
dated September 6, 1957 (R. 65) which reads as follows:
"ARRAIGNl\IEKT. This was the tiine to
which arraign1nent was heretofore continued on
August 30, 1957. The defendant appeared and was
represented by Elias Hansen, counsel. District
Attorney Jackson B. Howard represented the
State. The Infonnation was read and a copy
thereof was handed to the defendant. The defense
made a motion to quash the Information and the
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court granted the motion. The District Attorney
was granted permission to amend the Information.
The District Attorney is to furnish a bill of particulars within ten days. To the charge contained
in the amended Information the defendant entered
a plea of 'not guilty,' and trial was ordered set
for November 4, 1957, at 10:00 a.m. The defendant
was released on bond heretofore furnished in this
matter." (Emphasis added.)
It is thus clear that the only Motion to Quash the Information that was filed in this case was granted rather
than denied as alleged by defendant. The defendant, having received the benefit of the Court's ruling upon this
point in the lower court, has obviously mistaken his position upon this appeal. As a consequence there is no issue
involved herein upon which this Court may exercise its
judicial power.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
THE STATE OF UTAH TO FILE ITS AMENDED INFORMATION, AND FURTHERMORE, THE DEFENDANT FAILED
TO MAKE HIS OBJECTION TIMELY IN THIS MATTER AND
IS THEREFORE PRECLUDED FROM PURSUING HIS APPEAL UPON THIS POINT.

In answer to defendant's Assignment or Point II, we
cite Section 77-17-3, U.O.A. 1953, as authority for the
State's action in this regard. The pertinent portion of
that statute reads as follows:
"77-17-3. Amendments.-*** An information
may be amended, without leave of court, in any
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matter of form or substance at any time before
the defendant pleads thereto. ••*"
The minute entry set forth under Point I is indicative
of the procedural fact that the defendant entered his plea
of "not guilty" to the Amended Information, thus revealing that the amendment of the information in this case
preceded the plea of defendant and was fully in accord
with the above statute.
The defendant claims that the Amended Complaint
was vague, uncertain and calculated "to keep defendant
in the dark as to the particulars of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him." The Amended Complaint
reads as follows:
"Comes now Jackson B. Howard, District Attorney of the State of Utah, and accuses Kurt M.
Lyman, he having been bound over to answer this
charge by a Committing Magistrate, and charges
that the said Kurt l\L Lyman on or about the 15th
day of April, 1957, in Utah County did commit the
crime of a felony, to wit: Embezzlement, in that
he did embezzle property in excess of $50.00 from
the Lyman Finance Corporation." (R. 8).
As part of defendant's argument, he states, at page 13
of his brief on appeal, that this Court is committed to
the following proposition of law:
"1. That one charged with a crime may be
bound over to the district court to answer only
to the charge contained in the Complaint filed
before the Com/lm.ffing Afagistrate, and upon which
he has been given a preliminary hearing, unless
such prelilninary hearing, with consent of the
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State, is waived, or of an offense necessarily included within the charged offense." (Emphasis
added.)
Therefore it certainly must have been defendant's understanding that he was being charged in the information
with the same act or offense charged in the complaint,
even though the exact language employed in the complaint
was not incorporated in the information. Can it possibly
be claimed that a charge of embezzling an amount in
excess of $50.00 would not include the ultimate proof of a
single act of embezzlement of $12,0001 And is this not
especially so when the act upon which the conviction is
obtained is the same as that charged in the original complaint, and necessarily so 1 There could be no conviction
under these circumstances for any other specific act
of embezzlement than that named in the complaint. It
necessarily follows that defendant was thus advised, during the entire course of these proceedings, of the specific
act upon which he was required to defend himself, and a
contrary contention can be sustained only without the aid
of logic. That defendant was so advised, in addition to
the above, we cite the answers made to defendant's requested Bill of Particulars which were served upon defendant and the sufficiency of which was never challenged
by defendant until he undertook this appeal. By his own
conduct defendant acknowledged that his informational
objectives were satisfied by this document. This makes
his position untenable upon this appeal insofar as he
claims uncertainty as to the particulars of the accusation
against him. This Bill of Particulars, in addition to the
original complaint and amended information, must have
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been the basis upon which defendant prepared his defense
inasmuch as he admits that it was not until he processed
his appeal that he discovered the Bill of Particulars had
not been filed with the Court as required by Section 77-219, U.C.A. 1953, which provides, in part, as follows:
"77-21-9. Bill of Particulars.-*** (5) When
any bill of particulars is furnished it shall be
filed of record and a copy of such bill be given
to the defendant."
The defendant had not, prior to this appeal, objected to
the sufficiency or form of the Bill of Particulars furnished him in this case. His only objection now is that a copy
was not filed with the Court. He does not allege that this
in any way prejudiced him in his defense. This Court has
held that the purpose of a bill of particulars is to inform
defendant of the particulars of the offense sufficiently
to enable him to prepare his defense. State v. Jameson,
103 U. 129, 134 P.2d 173. This it did in the instant case
irregardless of the fact that it ,,.,.as not filed with the
Court.
Furthermore, the Court instructed the jury as to the
particular act charged against the defendant in its Instruction No. 2 which reads, in part, as follows:

"*** The particular property charged to have
been embezzled is money of the Lyman Finance
Corporation, represented by a check dated April
15, 1957, in the sum of $12,000.00, made payable
to Carlisle Corporation, and signed Lyman Finance Corporation~ by l{urt ~I. Ly1nan, President.
""**" (R. 37).
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It is absolutely clear from the above that the defendant
was fully informed at every step in this prosecution of
the particular offense, and specific act constituting that
offense, with which he was charged, and his ultimate
conviction was based solely upon the particular act of
defendant in embezzling the sum of $12,000 from the
Lyman Finance 'Corporation on April15, 1957, with which
he was charged from the inception of this action.
The defendant further relies upon the allegations of
the original complaint as insufficient to inform him of
the specific act with which he was charged. The complaint
charged:
"*** that Kurt M. Lyman on or about the 15th
day of April, 1957, at Utah County, State of Utah,
did commit the crime of a felony, to-wit: Embezzlement, committed as follows: That he, the
said Kurt M. Lyman, at the time and place aforesaid, did embezzle $12,000.00, the property of the
Lyman Finance Corporation of Provo, Utah
County, Utah, which said money had been entrusted with the said Kurt M. Lyman as officer
for said Lyman Finance Corporation, and did
appropriate the same to his own use." (Emphasis
added.)
It is argued by defendant that he could not reasonably
anticipate that he would be called upon to defend an act
of using the money of one corporation to pay the obligations of another under the emphasized portion of the
complaint quoted above. However, to appropriate "to
one's own use'' does not necessarily mean to one's personal advantage. Every attempt by one person to dispose
of the goods of another, without right, as if they were
his own is a conversion to his own use. 18 Am. Jur., Em-
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bezzlement, § 21. State v. Ross, 55 Ore. 450, 104 P. 596,
106 P. 1022, 42 L.R.A. (N.S.) 601, (writ of error dismissed in 227 U.S. 150, 57 L. Ed. 458, 33 S. Ct. 220, Ann.
Cas. 1914C, 224). Thus in a case similar to the one at bar,
State v. Foust, 114 N:C. 842, 19 S.E. 275, the accused
received a check as the property of one company, and
applied it to the credit, not of that company, but of another. The court in that case held that an indictment
which charged that defendant "did convert to his own
use, and embezzle" was sufficient and the court's instruction was proper that defendant was guilty if he received
the check and misapplied it fraudulently, whether he converted it to his own personal benefit or not. In the case
of Sta,te v. Milbrath, 138 Wis. 354, 120 N.W. 252, 131 Am.
St. Rep. 1012, the defendant, as a member of a firm engaged in loaning money, received $300 from a client to
loan on real estate security. The loan was made, the
securities being taken in the name of a person from whom
defendant held a general power of attorney and assigned
by defendant to the client, the assignments not being
recorded. A corporation was formed to take over the
firm's business, which was controlled by the members
of the finn. The loan was repaid to the corporation in
defendant's presence when the corporation was insolvent,
and was mixed with the corporation's funds and used by
the corporation, which c.ontinued to pay interest upon
the loan until it beca1ne bankrupt. The defendant and
another corporation officer were charged in an information with the embezzlement of said sum, and the unlawful
and fraudulent conversion thereof to their own use. In
response to the question whether the n1oney 'vas con-
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verted to their own use, as charged in the information,
the court answered at page 255, 120 N.W. Reporter:

"*** One may convert money of another to
his own use by paying it out upon his private or
personal debt. Guenther v. State (Wis.) 118 N.W.
640. If this is true, he can convert the money to
his own use by puttimg it into the treasury and
mimgling it with the funds of an insolvent corporation which is under his control and management,
and of which he is a stockholder and officer in
charge. The benefit he receives in the first case
by discharge of his personal debt is equal to the
whole amount of the money so paid. The benefit
which he receimes ~n the second oase is not equal
to the whole amount of the money so paid. But
the extent to which defendant was benefitted does
not constitute the test. It is paid to his own use
in either case. It is paid into that which is a
mere instrumentality created by him under sanction of law, but as much under his control and as
subservient to his will as the furniture of his office
or the books of account in which he records his
transactions. Under such circumstances, there is
no room for the legal fiction of separate corporate
personality or for distinction between the defendant's acts as officer of the corporation and his
acts as an independent natural person." (Emphasis added.)
The Milbrath case is, in all legal respects, identical to the
case at bar. The defendant in each case has converted
money to the direct benefit of an insolvent corporation
of which he was an officer and over which he exercised
direct control. In each instance the defendant was
charged with converting the alleged embezzled property
to his own use. It therefore follows, as in the Milbrath
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case, that the complaint in this case was not defective
for charging a conversion to the defendant's own use
in that such a charge does, in fact, include a conversion
which constitutes an indirect benefit to the defendant
by providing a direct benefit to an insolvent corporation
over which the defendant has control and management.
In addition to the above argument concerning the
allegations of the complaint, we again direct the court's
attention to the bill of particulars which was furnished
the defendant in this case wherein the District Attorney
informed the defendant that the state, insofar as proof
of defendant's intention was concerned, would prove
"criminal intention, particularly the intent to fraudulently appropriate to his own use or to the use of some
other person or corporation moneys or credits ,,~hich have
come into his possession by virtue of his trust as an officer in the Lyman Finance Corporation.'' (Pages 3 and 4,
Appellant's Brief). We reiterate that defendant at no
time prior to his appeal objected to the sufficiency of
tlris Bill of Particulars and the District Attorney's failure
to file a copy thereof with the court was not prejudicial
to the defendant's rights.
POINT III.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE EXHIBITS "B'' AND "C."

The most recent holding of tllis court upon tllis subject is to be found in the case of State v. Lack. 118 U. 128,
221 P. 2d 852, wherein the court held that in a prosecution
for embezzlement of bottles of whiskey during defend-
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ant's conduct of a package agency for the State Liquor
Control Commission, evidence that defendant sold case
lots of liquor to various clubs and split premium payments therefor with others was not inadmissible as showing other offenses not pleaded, but was competent to show
defendant's scheme or plan and intent to embezzle whiskey. So here this evidence was admissible to show the
chain of circumstances and the scheme or plan employed
by the defendant in effecting the act of embezzlement
with which he was charged. Although this check was
signed by Paul C. Black, the Secretary and Treasurer of
the Lyman Finance Company, it represented the first
check drawn by that company, of which the defendant was
then President and Director, for the alleged purpose of
purchasing the "flooring" held by another finance cmnpany. Furthermore, the check was made payable to the
Lyman Motor, Inc., which defendant managed as President. (Tr. 9-18). This was the first step in a well conceived plan or scheme in the mind of the defendant to
fraudulently appropriate another's money to extricate
himself from threatened exposure for other fraudulent
acts and was, therefore, admissible in evidence to shed
light on that plan or scheme.
In addition to the above it is clear that the defendant
cannot complain that the admission of certain documentary evidence introduced by plaintiff was prejudicial,
where the defendant himself had testified to all the facts
contained in the assailed exhibit. People v. Dunn, 40
Cal. App. 2d 6, 104 P. 2d 119, certiorari denied 61 S. ·Ct.
139, 311 U.S. 701, 85 L. Ed. 454. The evidence which
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defendant would have this court disallow consists of
a check in the amount of $6,000 issued by Lyman Finance
Corporation, over the signature of Paul C. Black, payable to Lyman Motor, Incorporated, as well as the check
stub evidencing the payment made by this particular
check. Yet the defendant himself described the check in
detail and testified as to every material fact it contained.
(Tr. 171-172). Under these circumstances the defendant
cannot complain of the admission of this evidence for
even if there were error in admitting this evidence it
is cured by the defendant's admissions covering the
same transactions. K reinbring v. United States (C.A.
Minn.) 216 F. 2d 671.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
THE WITNESS, PAUL BLACK, TO ANSWER THE QUESTION:

"WAS THERE ANY AUTHORIZATION MADE TO

MR. LYMAN, OR TO ANY OTHER PERSON, BY THE BOARD
OF DIRECTORS, AUTHORIZING THE P AY:JIENT FOR
SOMETHING OTHER THAN FLOORING OR CONTRACTS?"
AS AMENDED BY ADDING THERETO "TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE?"

The defendant does not deny that Mr. Black was a
director of the Lyman Finance Company and the testimony affirms that fact. (Tr. 11, 24). As such he is chargeable with knowledge of what transpires at meetings of
the Board of Directors. Gay v. Young Men's Consol.
Co-op. Mercantile Inst. et al., 37 U. 280, 107 P. 237. Therefore, his parol evidence is admissible to prove a fact
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where the fact to be proved is of such a character that it
would not be shown by the corporate records. 32 ·C.J.S.,
Evidence, § 810 (a) ( 2). And the fact that the records of
a corporation contain no entry relevant to the matter does
not preclude parol evidence that certain action was not
taken by the corporation. United Order of Golden Cross
v. Hooser, 160 Ala. 334, 49 So. 354. Thus :Mr. Black, who
was testifying from his own knowledge as a director of
the corporation, was properly allowed to testify that
the Board of Directors had not authorized "the payment
for something other than flooring or contracts." And,
contrary to defendant's contention, it was most material
to determine the extent of the authority granted to the
defendant by the Board of Directors, for the nonexistence of such authority becomes the essential element in the determination of the existence of the crime
as charged.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
STRIKE THE EVIDENCE OF MR. BLACK THAT FERDINAND ERICKSON WAS A DIRECTOR OF THE LYMAN

MOTOR COMPANY.

It is well settled law that a director of a corporation
who has failed to file his oath as required by statute
is not a de jure officer, but as to third persons his acts
as a de facto director are valid and binding, if otherwise
legal, and the corporation, its officers and stockholders
may, by acquiescence, become estopped from disputing
such authority. Schwab v. Frisco Min. & Mxll Co., 21
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U. 258, 60 P. 940. Therefore, Mr. Black's testimony that
Ferdinand Erickson was a director of Lyman Finance
Corporation was properly admitted in evidence over defendant's motion to strike even though Mr. Erickson had
not taken his oath of office. His failure to qualify as a
de jure director could not effect his status as a de facto
director. In fact, the de facto officer exists because of the
failure of that officer to achieve de jure status.

Furthermore, the evidence complained of m this
assignment of error was not prejudicial to the defendant
in any respect. Whether or not :\Ir. Erickson was a director of the corporation, either de jure or de facto,
would have no possible effect upon the jury in its determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused, nor
could it have confused the jury and cast upon the defendant a suspicion of wrongdoing not connected with the
crime charged because there is not a scintilla of malfeasance to be i1nputed from the fact that this man was a
director of the corporation.
POINT VI.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING

MR. BLACK, OVER THE OBJECTIONS OF COUNSEL FOR

DEFENDANT, TO TESTIFY THAT WHEN HE AND MR.

HARMON TOOK OVER THE MANAGEMENT OF THE LY·

MAN MOTOR COMPANY THERE WAS IN EXCESS OF

$5,000.00 OVERDRAFT AT THE BANK. INSOFAR AS THH

WITNESS FURTHER TESTIFIED AS TO THE FINANCIAl

CONDITION OF THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY AT PAGEf

36-37 OF THE TRANSCRIPT, EACH AND EVERY ONE 01
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DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS WAS SUSTAINED THUS AFFORDING NO BASIS UPON WHICH DEFENDANT MAY
APPEAL.

This court has held, in accordance with the majority
rule, that evidence of accused's financial circumstances
and expenditures at, or immediately before, the time of
an alleged conversion in an embezzlement proceeding is
relevant. Thus in the case of State v. Judd, 74 U. 398, 279
P. 953, wherein a deputy county treasurer was charged
with embezzling county funds, the court said, at page 957
of 279 Pacific Reporter:

"*** The practices of keeping the records and
the handling of the money of the department was
a proper subject for inquiry, and the question concerning the financial stress of accused and his betting on horse races were relevant as bearing upon
a motive for the commission of the acts by defendant which the prosecution was attempting to
prove."

And it has been held that evidence of the desperate financial condition of a brokerage company was competent to
f. prove motive or connection of its president with the emli bezzlement of proceeds from the sale of stock. State v.
Cooke, 130 Ore. 552, 278 P. 936.
It follows from the above authodties that the financial condition of the Lyman Motor Company, of which
defendant was President, was competent evidence to
prove the motive of the defendant in embezzling funds
from another company which he also headed as President.
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POINT VII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
MR. BLACK TO TESTIFY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL
FOR DEFENDANT, THAT DEFENDANT WAS OWING TO
THE LYMAN MOTOR COMPANY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD
OF $800.00.

Upon cross examination of Mr. Black by counsel for
defendant it was inferred that the defendant had not
personally received any money from the Lyman Finance
Corporation because all moneys were paid to the Lyman
Motor Company. (Tr. 48-49). Therefore it was proper,
upon redirect examination, for the witness to testify that
his examination of the financial records revealed a debit
balance of $800 owing the Lyman :Motor Company by
the defendant for money advanced, thus showing that
defendant had access to the funds of the corporation for
his own personal use. It is proper to question a witness
on redirect examination to explain statements made on
cross-examination. 32 ·C.J.S., Evidence, § 548 (a).
POINT VIII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
EXHIBIT "J" TO BE RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE OVER THE
OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT.

Exhibit J, an application to the Utah State Securities
Commission for permission to sell stock to the public in
Lyman Finance Corporation, provides that the proceeds
from the sale of stock would be used for certain described
purposes. It was properly admitted in evidence as part
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of the general scheme or plan of defendant in making
available the funds which were subsequently appropriated to his own uses. State v. Lack, supra. Evidence that
the proceeds from the sale of stock were not used for the
purposes specifically mentioned in the application may
be admitted to show the intent of the defendant in the
commission of the offense with which the defendant
stands charged. State v. Cooke, supra. The rule as stated
in 29 C.J.S., Embezzlement,§ 41, is as follows:
"Since from its nature intent is incapable of
direct proof, great latitude is necessarily allowed
in proving this element of the offense. Broadly
speaking, any evidence is admissible which has a
tendency, even the slightest, to establish fraudulent intent on the one hand, or, on the other hand,
to show the bona fides of the accused. *"" *"
POINT IX
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
STRIKE THE STATEMENT OF MR. ZENGER WHILE TESTIFYING FOR THE PLAINTIFF THAT THE SITUATION WAS
BEYOND THE STAGE OF BEING CONTRACTS, AND WAS
OF A ·CRIMINAL NATURE.

The following is that portion of the trial transcript
to be found from line 21, page 88, to line 7, page 89:

Q. Was the security that was given to you sufficient to pay off these fictitious contracts~
A. No sir.
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Q. When you talked to Mr. Lyman did you tell
him what you were going to do if they weren't
paid~

A. I recall saying in his presence and in the presence of Mr. Carlisle, who I called to come down
because of the seriousness of the situation, that
this was beyond the stage of bum contracts, but
it certainly was of a criminal nature and it required further action.
MR. HANSEN: If the court please, we object to
that as (and~) move that it be stricken, what Mr.
Carlisle said.
THE WITNESS : I said that in the presence of
Mr. Lyman and Mr. Carlisle.
MR. HOWARD: That is what he said.
THE COURT: That is w·hat I understood. The
motion to strike is denied.
(Parenthetic phrase added.)
It is immediately apparent from the transcript that the
defendant's motion to strike \Yas aimed at what he
thought to be hearsay evidence of what :Jir. Carlisle said.
That not being the case the motion \Yas not well taken
and was, therefore, proper}~- denied. A party wishing
the benefit of an objection n1ust show how he is hurt. A
rule of evidence not invoked is \Yaived. "rigmore on
Evidence, Third Edition, § lS. The defendant cannot
prevail upon appeal where he failed to state the rule of
evidence upon which he relied in Inaking his objection to
offered evidence in the trial proceeding.
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POINT X.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PERMITTING
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, OVER OBJECTION OF COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT, TO CROSS EXAMINE THE DEFENDANT AS TO CERTAIN CHECKS MADE OUT BY THE
DEFENDANT TO VARIOUS OTHER PERSONS.

The defendant had testified that a certain list of
contracts which had been assigned to the Carlisle Finance
Company by the Lyman Motor Company contained some
"valid" and some "incorrect" contracts. (Tr. 176-184).
Thus it was entirely proper for the court to allow the
District Attorney to impeach the testimony of the defendant by showing the fraudulent nature of these contracts,
and to question him concerning his knowledge of the disposition of the money represented by the checks in question. As to the state's proffered Exhibits "P" and "Q"
the defendant admitted signing them. (Tr. 200). The
fictitious names or non-existent individuals named in
these contracts and checks, and acknowledged as such by
defendant (Tr.198-199), are examples of defendant's participation in other fraudulent schemes and was, therefore,
a proper subject of cross examination for the purpose
of proving the intent, motive or scheme of defendant in
committing the crime with which he was charged. State
v. Lack, supra. The defendant cites the case of State v.
Lanos, 63 U. 151, 223 P. 1065, as authority to sustain his
position on this point. That case stands for the proposition that cross examination, even though objectionable,
would not constitute reversible error in the absence of
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objection or exception. It has no application to the matter
herein considered.
POINT XI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 1.

The plaintiff incorporates its arguments under
Points I and II in answer to Point XI contained in defendant's brief.
POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 2.

The plaintiff incorporates its argument under Point
II, insofar as it relates to the appropriation of the property to defendant's "own use," in answer to Point XII
contained in defendant's brief.
POINT XIII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
INSTRUCT THE JURY AS REQUESTED BY DEFENDANT
IN HIS REQUEST NO. 4.

In the case of State v. Anderson, 75 U. 496, 286 P.
645, this court, upon which defendant's learned counsel
was then a member, held that objections to instructions
could not be considered on appeal without exceptions.
This case was cited by the Court in a later case, State v.
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Cooper, 114 U. 531, 201 P.2d 764, wherein it was held that
an appeal would not be heard upon the alleged error of
the lower court in refusing to give a requested instruction where no exception had been taken to the court's
refusal to give such instruction. No exception was taken
to the court's failure to give the requested instruction
in the instant case, nor was the court's attention ever
directed to the omission complained of herein until after
the trial jury was discharged. Under these circumstances
we do not feel that the lower court's failure to give the
requested instruction constituted reversible error.
Furthermore, the instructions of the court were explicit in this regard. In its Instruction No. 2, the court
informed the jury that:
"The particular property charged to have
been embezzled is money of the Lyman Finance
Corporation, represented by a check dated April
15, 1957, in the sum of $12,000.00, made payable
to Carlisle Corporation, and signed Lyman Finance Corporation, by Kurt M. Lyman, President." (R. 37).
The same instruction charged the state with the burden
of proving every material allegation to the jury's satisfaction beyond reasonable doubt, and Instruction No. 3
sets forth the material allegations upon which proof beyond a reasonable doubt would be required to sustain
a conviction for embezzlement. Such material allegations included the proof of the execution of the $12,000.00
check by the defendant without authority for a purpose
not in the due and lawful execution of his trust as an
officer of the Lyman Finance Corporation. (R. 38). In-
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struction No. 17 charged the jury that unless it found
beyond a reasonable doubt that the $12,000.00 check was
not paid for valid contracts for the sale of automobiles,
it must find the defendant not guilty. (R. 49). Thus the
jury was adequately instructed as to the acts which it
was required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have
existed as a matter of fact in order to sustain a verdict
of guilty. These instructions leave no room for the jury
to infer guilt for the crime charged from other acts, the
proof of which was essential to show the scheme, plan,
intent and motive of the defendant in committing the
alleged crime.
POINT XIV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5,
NOR DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN GIVING ITS OWN
INSTRUCTION NO. 5.

We incorporate herein our argument set forth under
Point II, insofar as it relates to the appropriation to the
defendant's "own use" of the funds in question, in answer
to Point XIV contained in defendant's brief.
POINT XV.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO
GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO.8.

Defendant's requested instruction No. 8 is as follows:
"You are instructed that the Articles of Incorporation of the Lyman Finance Corporation
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authorized the defendant, Kurt M. Lyman, to loan
the money of the Lyman Finance Corporation to
the Lyman Motor Company, and to borrow, on
behalf of the Lyman Finance Corporation, money
from the Carlisle Finance Company."
The defendant contends that this instruction should have
been given inasmuch as the Articles of Incorporation
of the Lyman Finance Corporation granted the following
powers to the corporation:
"To borrow money and to execute notes and
obligations and obligations and security contracts
therefor, and to lend any of the money or funds
of the Corporation and to take evidence of indebtedness therefor." (Emphasis added.)
Surely the defendant recognizes that the powers of a
corporation are to be exercised by its board of directors.
Section 16-2-21, U.C.A. 1953, so provides. It is therefore
elemental that, in the absence of any delegation of authority by the Board of Directors at Lyman Finance
Corporation, the defendant, even as the corporation's
President, could not personally exercise the powers conferred upon the corporation by its charter. Yet defendant's requested instruction No. 8 would have charged
the jury that defendant had such power. The requested
instruction was, therefore, properly denied.
We herewith add that no "evidence of indebtedness"
was ever introduced in this proceeding to add credence
to defendant's claim that the money was loaned other
than the check itself. It is apparent that the powers conferred upon the corporation by its Articles of Incorporation contemplated some "evidence of indebtedness" to be
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taken in addition to the proceeds of a negotiated loan,
even if such a loan were authorized by the corporation's
board of directors. In fact, the defendant himself stated
that he would not classify the money taken from the Lyman Finance Company as a loan. (Tr. 213).
POINT XVI.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIVING ITS
NINTH INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY.

Our Supreme Court, in construing Section 16-2-21,
U.C.A. 1953, supra, has held that a president of a corporation, as such, has ordinarily only such powers as are
possessed by a director, or such powers as may be directly
conferred upon him by the board of directors. Lochwitz
v. Pine Tree Min. & Mill. Co., 37 U. 349, 108 P. 1128;
Copper King lllin. Co. v. Hanson, 52 U. 605, 176 P. 623.
And this is true notwithstanding a resolution of the
stockholders vesting such officer with power. Anderson
v. Grantsville North Willow Irr. Co., 51 U.137, 169 P. HiS.
It is thus clear that the defendant, as President of Lyman
Finance Corporation, had no power to loan the corporation's money, and the lower court's Instruction No. 9
correctly set forth the powers of corporate directors and
officers. We further incorporate our argmnent contained
under Point XV in answer to the question here presented.
POINT XVII.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN ARREST OF JUDGMENT.
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The amount of money supposedly advanced by the
Lyman Motor Company to the Lyman Finance Corporation consisted primarily of Mr. Black's salary of $600 per
month for a period of approximately three months. Even
as to the payment of this sum, the defendant testified
that he had no authority from the Board of Directors of
the motor company authorizing him so to do. (Tr. 171,
213-14). Other expenses claimed to have been advanced
by the motor company to the finance company consisted
of office space, etc. According to the defendant's own
testimony, the total amount would be four or five thousand dollars. (Tr. 213). Yet the motor company was
paid $6,000 out of the first proceeds from the sale of
stock of the finance corporation. (Tr. 17-18). Furthermore, the motor company received the benefit of checks
in the amounts of $1,753.03 and $246.97 from the finance
company to the Carlisle Corporation in addition to the
$12,000 check upon which this case is based. (Tr. 19-21).
Thus it is clear that no debtor-creditor relationship existed between the motor company and the finance company at the time of the alleged embezzlement, and certainly no such relationship existed between the finance
company and the defendant, such as to remove this case
from the embezzlement statutes. Furthermore, a charge
of embezzlement is sustained by proof that the accused
has received a sum of money as agent for another and
converted the same to his own use even though a portion
is applied to the satisfaction of a debt owed to him by
the principal. State v. Peterson, 61 U. 91, 211 P. 694.
The debtor-creditor exception has absolutely no applica-
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tion to this defendant's action. There is not one whit of
evidence which would indicate that the finance company
was indebted to the defendant for a single cent. Therefore, defendant's Point XVII is without merit.
POINT XVIII.
THE TRIAL ·COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL.

By virtue of the foregoing arguments in answer to
defendant's claimed errors, plaintiff submits that the
lower court did not err in denying defendant a new trial.
CONCLUSION
The defendant's appeal in this case should be denied
and the verdict and judgment of the District Court in
this matter should be affirmed.
Respectfully subn1itted,

E. R. CALLISTER
Attorney General

JACK L. CRELLIN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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